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I. INTRODUCTION
The class action represents an exception to the fundamental le-
gal principle "that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in
a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he
has not been made a party by service of process."' Invented by the
courts of equity, class actions were preserved by the drafters of the
Field Code2 by an amendment adopted in 1849.3 Nebraska remains
one of the few states that continue to use procedural statutes
based on the Field Code, and its class action statute, section 25-319
of the Nebraska Revised Statutes,4 is almost identical to the class
action provision of the Field Code.5
This article will first briefly discuss the historical development
of class actions. It will then analyze the Nebraska statute and rele-
vant case law, with particular emphasis on the types of class ac-
tions that are maintainable under Nebraska law. This article will
show that the Nebraska class action statute is much more restric-
tive than Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure6 and has
* B.A., 1961, University of Nebraska; J.D., 1963, University of Nebraska. Partner,
Fitzgerald, Brown, Leahy, Strom, Schorr & Barmettler, Omaha, Nebraska.
** B.A. with distinction, 1974, University of Wisconsin; J.D. magna cum laude,
1977, Creighton University. Associate, Fitzgerald, Brown, Leahy, Strom,
Schorr & Barmettler, Omaha, Nebraska.
1. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
2. Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497. The Field Code was named for
the chairman of the three-man commission that drafted the Code, David Dud-
ley Field. C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF TE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 22 (2d ed.
1947).
3. Act of Apr. 11, 1849, ch. 438, § 119, 1849 N.Y. Laws 639. See text accompanying
note 8 infra.
4. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (Reissue 1979). See text accompanying note 27 infra.
5. Act of Apr. 11, 1849, ch. 438, § 119, 1849 N.Y. Laws 639. See text accompanying
note 8 infra. The states besides Nebraska that have class action statutes pat-
terned after the Field Code include: California, CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 382
(West 1973); Oklahoma, OxU.& STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 232 (West 1960); and South
Carolina, S.C. CODE § 15-5-50 (1977).
6. FED. R. Crv. P. 23.
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seldom been applied by the Nebraska Supreme Court in a manner
favorable to the plaintiff.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF CLASS ACTIONS
Class actions were created by the courts of equity to remedy
situations in which strict adherence to the rule of compulsory join-
der would frustrate the purpose of the courts of equity-to render
justice. Thus, in instances where the parties interested in the sub-
ject matter of a lawsuit were so numerous that joinder of all was
impossible, the courts of equity developed the class or representa-
tive action to enable a decree to be entered. In order for class ac-
tions to be brought, however, the courts of equity required that the
number of persons involved be such that it was impracticable to
settle the controversy completely, and that a joint interest or a
community of interest exist among the numerous persons.7
Class actions were incorporated into the Field Code by an 1849
amendment which provided the following exception to the compul-
sory joinder rules: "[A]nd when the question is one of a common
or general interest of many persons, or when the parties are very
numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the
court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole."8
While the above provision is stated in the disjunctive, indicating
that the mere fact that parties are numerous is sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of the statute, the courts construing statutes pat-
terned after the Field Code provision have required a "common
interest" despite the language of the statute.9
This construction of the Field Code provision is consistent with
the language of Equity Rule 38, the class action rule adopted in the
federal courts prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Equity Rule 38 provided: "When the question is one of
common or general interest to many persons constituting a class
so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before
the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole."'0 Thus,
Equity Rule 38 made it clear that both numerosity of parties and a
common interest were required before a class action was
maintainable.
The next major development in the federal system was the
adoption in 1938 of the original Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. This rule limited class actions to persons constituting a
class "so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all
7. Simeone, Class Suits Under the Codes, 7 W. REs. L. REv. 5, 12 (1955).
8. Act of Apr. 11, 1849, ch. 438, § 119, 1849 N.Y. Laws 639.
9. Simeone, supra note 7, at 15.
10. Fed. Equity IL 38, 226 U.S. 659 (1912).
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before the court," provided that the named parties "fairly insure
the adequate representation of all."" The rule further specified
three types of class actions12 that have become known as "true,"
"hybrid," and "spurious."13 These classifications were "dependent
upon the jural relationships of the members of the class."14 Pro-
fessor James Moore, the primary draftsman of original Rule 23, rec-
ommended that a judgment in a true class action bind all members
of the class and that a judgment in a hybrid class action bind the
rights of the class with respect to the property involved, but that a
judgment in a spurious class action should not bind nonappearing
members of the class.' 5 The courts adopted these recommenda-
tions for the three types of class actions.16 The spurious class ac-
tion in reality is a misnomer because the absence of a binding
judgment on nonappearing "class" members made it an entirely
different creature than the class action developed in the courts of
equity.17
In 1966, the present Rule 2318 was adopted, and "the federal sys-
tem detached itself from the restrictive notion, conceived under
the Field Code and ratified by the Moore rule, that the propriety of
11. FED. R. Cry. P. 23, 308 U.S. 689 (1939).
12. Id. The rule provided:
(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so nu-
merous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court,
such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate repre-
sentation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the charac-
ter of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the own-
er of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of
the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of
claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the
action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact af-
fecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.
Id.
13. 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.08-.10 app. (2d ed. 1980).
14. Id. 23.08[1], at 23-2505. A true class suit required a "joint, common, or deriv-
ative" right. Id. In a hybrid class suit there existed, "in lieu of joint or com-
mon interests, the presence of property which called for distribution or
management." Id. $ 23.09, at 23-2571. Finally, in a spurious class action, there
were no jural relationships between the members of the class; there were
simply common questions of law or fact. Id. 23.10[1], at 23-2602. See note 12
supra.
15. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Pre-
liminary Draft, 25 GEO. L. REV. 551, 570-76 (1937).
16. For a discussion of how the courts treated these three types of class actions
under the original Rule 23, see 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.11[1]-[4]
app. (2d ed. 1980).
17. See M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 81 (1972).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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class actions depends on pre-existing intraclass jural relations."' 9
Rule 23, as amended, is divided into five parts. First, it spells out
the prerequisites for any class action: (1) a class so numerous that
joinder is impracticable; (2) a question of law or fact common to
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representatives are typi-
cal of the class; and (4) the representatives fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. 20 Second, the rule designates
three types of class actions, which resemble the three types in the
original Rule 23, but specifies as to the third type of class action,
more detailed instructions for the guidance of the court.21 Third,
Rule 23 attempts to define the duties of the judge in the conduct of
class actions.22 Fourth, the rule provides for protective orders
which the court may enter during the course of class action litiga-
tion.23 Finally, Rule 23 states that a class action cannot be dis-
missed or compromised without court approval and prior notice to
all members of the class. 2 4 By adding the notion that the mere
presence of common questions of law or fact could result in a judg-
ment binding on absent class members, the restructured rule con-
siderably broadened the types of cases that can be prosecuted or
defended as class actions with binding effect on nonappearing
members25 of the class.
Im. THE NEBRASKA STATUTE
The Nebraska class action statute, originally enacted in 1867 as
Section 43 of the Nebraska Code of Civil Procedure,2 6 provides:
"When the question is one of a common or general interest of
many persons, or when the parties are very numerous, and it may
be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
may sue or defend for the benefit of all."27 Although the statute is
stated in the disjunctive, the Nebraska Supreme Court has never
taken the position that numerosity alone satisfies the statute.28
19. Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 609,
629-30 (1971).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
21. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(b).
22. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c).
23. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(d).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
25. See generally 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 23.02-.97 (2d ed. 1980). This
article does not purport to analyze class actions under Rule 23. For a criti-
cism of the broad scope of Rule 23 as amended in 1966, see Simon, Class Ac-
tions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1972).
26. Act of Feb. 12, 1866, tit. HI, § 43, 1866-1877 Neb. Laws 134 (current version at
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (Reissue 1979)).
27. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (Reissue 1979).
28. See note 9 & accompanying text supra.
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The Nebraska Supreme Court has not limited the class action
statute to actions in equity, but has construed the statute as "an
application of the equitable doctrine of virtual representation...
[which is] applicable in appropriate circumstances to law ac-
tions." 29 The doctrine of virtual representation, which is the prin-
ciple underlying the class action developed in the courts of equity,
allows a court to proceed to a decree if the named parties fairly
represent nonappearing class members in the litigation of issues
in which all have a common interest.30 This doctrine "represents a
well recognized exception to the general rule that no person is
bound by a judgment or decree except parties or those who stand
in privity with parties." 31 It has long been applied in cases involv-
ing the unborn32 and in class or representative actions.33
This incorporation of the equitable class action device in all
civil actions is consistent with the Field Code framers' preference
for equitable principles of procedure.34 The framers viewed the
common law rules of procedure as too "'fixed, rigid, arbitrary and
technical'" in comparison to the" 'natural and flexible' "principles
of procedure in the equity suit.35
In construing the class action statute, the Nebraska Supreme
Court, in Evans v. Metropolitan Utilities District,3 6 defined the
proper representative plaintiff as follows: "The general rule is that
29. Blankenship v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 195 Neb. 170, 175, 237 N.W.2d 86, 89
(1976).
30. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). See also Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 344,
23 N.W.2d 323 (1946) (representative must have the power to satisfy judgment
on behalf of all members of the class), vacated on other grounds, 147 Neb.
1018, 25 N.W.2d 908 (1947).
31. Garside v. Garside, 80 Cal. App. 318, 324, 181 P.2d 665, 671 (1947).
32. See id. at 323-25, 181 P.2d 670-72, and cases cited therein; Drake v. Frazer, 105
Neb. 162, 179 N.W. 393 (1920).
33. See Padway v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 42 F. Supp. 569, 576 (E.D. Wis. 1942),
and cases cited therein.
34. C. KiEG wN, CASES IN CODE PLEADING § 39, at 324 (1926).
35. Id. § 39, at 325 (quoting 1 J. POMEROY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENc E § 113). With
respect to the common law principles of joinder of parties, the criticism was
harsh:
The doctrines of the common law concerning the parties to actions,
their joint or several rights and liabilities, and the form of judgment
based upon these respective kinds of right and liability, are the
crowning technicality of the system, resting upon verbal premises
which mean nothing, and built upon from these premises by the
most accurate processes of mere verbal logic. It was a fundamental
principle that no one could be a plaintiff unless he was, alone or
jointly with the co-plaintiffs, entitled to the whole recovery, nor a de-
fendant unless he was, alone or jointly with the co-defendants, liable
to the entire demand.
Id. § 39, at 325.
36. 185 Neb. 464, 176 N.W.2d 679 (1970).
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a plaintiff in a class action must have an interest in the controversy
common with those for whom he sues and there must be that unity
of interest between them that the action may be brought by them
jointly."37 As this language indicates, the class action require-
ments are to be interpreted in conjunction with the joinder rules.
Thus, in order to define the types of class actions which are allowa-
ble under the Nebraska statute, an examination of the Nebraska
joinder rules is necessary.
IV. JOINDER OF PARTIES AND CAUSES OF ACTION
Under the Nebraska permissive joinder statute, plaintiffs may
be joined only if they have "an interest in the subject of the action,
and in obtaining the relief demanded."38 Defendants, on the other
hand, may be joined if they have or claim "an interest in the con-
troversy adverse to the plaintiff' or "[are] necessary part [ies] to a
complete determination or settlement of the question involved
therein."3 9 The Nebraska compulsory joinder statute requires that
parties must be joined if they are "united in interest."4 0 Also, mul-
tiple causes of action which are joined must affect all parties in the
same capacity.4 1
Although Evans established the necessity of applying the join-
der statutes to determine the proper scope of class actions in Ne-
braska, it is not clear whether the permissive or compulsory
joinder sections are applicable. In Evans, the Nebraska Supreme
Court stated the general rule that a representative of a purported
class must have that type of "interest in a controversy common
with those for whom he sues and there must be that unity of inter-
est between them that the action may be brought by them
jointly."42 The use of the word "may" indicates that the permissive
joinder statutes are applicable. But, the Evans court also required
37. Id. at 467, 176 N.W.2d at 681.
38. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-311 (Reissue 1979). This section provides: "All persons
having an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief de-
manded, may be joined as plaintiffs, except as otherwise provided in this
chapter." Id.
39. Id. § 25-317. This section provides: "Any person may be made a defendant
who has or claims an interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or
who is a necessary party to a complete determination or settlement of the
question involved therein." Id.
40. Id. § 25-318. This section provides: "Of the parties to the action, those who
are united in interest must be joined as plaintiffs or defendants; but if the
consent of one who should have been joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained,
he may be made a defendant, the reason being stated in petition." Id.
41. Id. § 25-702. This section provides: "Except for product liability actions, the
causes of action so united must affect all the parties to the action, and not
require different places of trial" Id.
42. 185 Neb. at 467, 176 N.W.2d at 681 (emphasis added).
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a "unity of interest"4 3 between the plaintiffs, which approximates
the "united in interest" language of the compulsory joinder
statute.
In order to determine which joinder statute is appropriate, it is
necessary to examine the historical basis of joinder. The concept
of joinder in the courts of equity was more liberal than the com-
mon law joinder rules. 44 At common law, a plaintiff had to
be interested in the whole of the recovery, so that one judgment could be
rendered for all the plaintiffs in solido; that a judgment should be given to
one person for a certain sum of money or for certain lands or chattels be
awarded to another plaintiff, was regarded as the sheerest impossibility.4 5
In other words, there had to exist a joint interest and a right of
recovery as if the plaintiffs were a single party. This is similar to
the compulsory joinder notion that was carried into the Field
Code.46
In equity, however, there was no requirement that all plaintiffs
have a joint or identical interest.47 Rather, a material interest in
the subject matter of the suit48 or "a community of concern in the
subject matter and objects of the suit"49 sufficed.
The Field Code adopted the principles of equity with respect to
joinder of parties and introduced the permissive joinder of parties
concept into all civil actions, including those seeking legal relief.50
Under the Field Code, "various persons having a common interest
in a certain subject matter of litigation" were allowed to "join in
the pursuit of their rights to the extent that the relief sought [was]
of common interest, although they may [have] share [d] that com-
mon interest in unequal proportions." 51 However, the original
Field Code provisions governing permissive joinder were later
amended to "authorize joinder of parties when there are common
questions of law or fact and the right to relief asserted by or
against multiple parties arises from the same transaction or occur-
rence or series of transactions or occurrences." 52 Thus, the
amended Field Code introduced the "common question of law or
fact" principle into determining whether joinder was proper. This
principle allows the joinder of parties in more situations than does
the original Field Code and its counterparts. Significantly, Ne-
43. Id.
44. C. KIEGWIN, supra note 34, § 41, at 329-35.
45. Id. § 41, at 331 (quoting J. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES § 115).
46. See note 53 & accompanying text infra.
47. C. KIEGWIN, supra note 34, § 41, at 331.
48. Id. § 41, at 330 (quoting J. STORY, EQurry PLEADINGS § 72 (1840)).
49. Id. § 41, at 332.
50. Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, §§ 97-98, 100, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497.
51. C. KiEGWIN, supra note 34, § 41, at 337.
52. Homburger, supra note 19, at 616.
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braska has not amended its permissive joinder statute to adopt the
''common question of law or fact" analysis.
The Field Code (and thus the Nebraska statute) retained in its
compulsory joinder statute the common law requirement that par-
ties who are "united in interest" must be joined.53 As indicated
earlier, the class action provision became a part of the Field Code
in an 1849 amendment which created an exception to compulsory
joinder.54 The Court of Appeals of New York, in Brenner v. Title
Guarantee & Trust Co., 5 5 construed this provision as follows:
The Code section was intended to embody without change both the
general rule and the exception to that rule "in accordance with the then
existing practice of courts of equity." Its purpose was not to provide for
the joinder in one action of separate causes of action owned by different
plaintiffs. Its purpose was rather to retain "in the new practice the same
rules by which to determine whether the proper parties were before the
court, which then prevailed in the courts of chancery .... " In those cases
where it applied, one person may prosecute a cause of action or interpose
a defense for the benefit of others, who are not parties to the action, but
only where they might properly be joined as parties because they have a
common or general interest or are united in interest.
5 6
Significantly, the Brenner court refused to expand the scope of
representative actions to the level of the amended permissive join-
der rules57 and thus allow "common question of law or fact" analy-
sis to govern class actions. However, the court correctly
recognized that the scope of the equitable class action and the
Field Code class action were defined by the joinder provisions of
the courts of equity. The Brenner court apparently required the
parties to be "united in interest" or have a "common and general
interest,"5 8 which is broader than the compulsory joinder
requirement.
While the Nebraska class action statute immediately follows
the compulsory joinder statute, it is an independent provision.
This separation is logical because class actions were developed in
the courts of equity which operated under more liberal joinder
rules. Since the equity joinder rules were incorporated into the
original Field Code, it follows that the permissive joinder rules
should control the scope of properly maintainable class actions in
Nebraska.5 9
53. C. KiEGwiN, supra note 34, § 41, at 336.
54. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
55. 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890 (1937).
56. Id. at 235, 11 N.E.2d at 892 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 238, 11 N.E.2d at 893. See note 52 & accompanying text supra.
58. 276 N.Y. at 235, 11 N.E.2d at 892-93.
59. See generally Berkshire v. Douglas County Bd. of Equalization, 200 Neb. 113,
262 N.W.2d 449 (1978), wherein the Nebraska Supreme Court recognized that
the technical requirements of section 25-319 can be met without the class
1982]
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It must be remembered, however, that the joinder rules of the
original Field Code and the Nebraska statutes are narrower than
the "common question of law or fact" approach adopted in the
amended Field Code permissive joinder sections and in Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the Nebraska class action
statute is limited in scope by these narrow joinder rules, the types
of class actions properly maintainable in Nebraska are more lim-
ited than those brought under Rule 2360 or the amended Field
Code.61 Although the Nebraska Supreme Court has never directly
addressed the distinction between the actions allowable under
Rule 23 and those maintainable under the Nebraska statute, its de-
cisions construing the Nebraska statute reveal it is extremely diffi-
cult to bring a successful class action in Nebraska.62
V. THE NEBRASKA CLASS ACTION REQUIREMENTS
An analysis of the Nebraska Supreme Court class action deci-
sions reveals numerous prerequisites to maintaining a class ac-
tion. The court's decisions have generally been unfavorable to
plaintiffs, and the court has imposed the following prerequisites to
bringing a class action in Nebraska: proper joinder, no potentiality
of a conflict of interest, necessity, and manageability. This section
will examine each of these factors, and conclude with a brief exam-
ination of the procedural requirements for class actions in
Nebraska.
A. Joinder Requirement
In Evans v. Metropolitan Utilities District,63 the Nebraska
Supreme Court recognized that class actions were subject to the
requirement that the members of the class be unified to the extent
the suit could be brought jointly. Significantly, the court cited Cer-
tia v. University of Notre Dame du Lac64 as authority for this "gen-
eral rule."65 In Certia, the Indiana court construed a class action
statute identical to the Field Code provision 66 as follows:
members being considered as necessary parties. The holding was that an ac-
tion can meet the technical requirements of section 25-319 but still be disal-
lowed as a class action because the result would be the same whether the
action was brought as a class action or as an individual action.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
61. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
62. See notes 63-130 & accompanying text infra.
63. 185 Neb. 464, 467, 176 N.W.2d 679, 681 (1970). See notes 36-37 & accompanying
text supra.
64. 82 Ind. App. 542, 141 N.E. 318 (1924).
65. 185 Neb. at 467, 176 N.W.2d at 681.
66. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
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[T] he party who sues must have an interest in the controversy com-
mon with those for whom he sues, and there must be that unity of interest
between him and all such other parties that would entitle them to main-
tain the action if suit was brought by them jointly. The action is, in effect,
brought by all of the parties, and the party named as the plaintiff stands
simply as the representative of himself and all of the others.
If the interest is separate, then the action must be brought separately
by each person interested, for those having a separate interest cannot join
in the action.
6 7
In Certia, the purported members of the class owned cemetery lots
at various locations in the defendant's cemetery.68 The represen-
tative plaintiff brought the purported class action to enjoin burials
in the walkways of the cemetery.69 The Indiana court held that the
plaintiff could not bring the action because the interests of the var-
ious class members were separate, and that the plaintiff could only
bring his action with respect to the cemetery lots in which he had
an interest.7 0 The court further held that the plaintiff only had a
right of "ingress and egress to his own lot," and that the interest of
the plaintiff and of other lot owners was not a "common interest."7 1
Professor Homburger interpreted the Certia construction of the
Field Code type of class action statute as follows: "In states with
narrow rules of permissive joinder, courts relied upon those rules
to justify a narrow construction of the class action provision
.... "72 He further stated that "in states with liberal joinder provi-
sions, courts refused to construe those provisions as an expression
of legislative intent to broaden the class action rule as well." 73 Pro-
fessor Homburger's thesis was that even in liberal permissive join-
der states, the Field Code class action provision
carried into the [Field] Code's unitary system of procedure at law and in
equity the burden of an old line of equity cases which, in the absence of
independent grounds for equity jurisdiction, refused to entertain bills of
peace to avoid multiplicity of suits unless a bond of "privity" existed be-
tween the multiple parties. 74
As discussed previously, the Nebraska permissive joinder stat-
67. 82 Ind. App. at 544, 141 N.E. at 319 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 543, 141 N.E. at 319.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 547, 141 N.E. at 320.
71. Id.
72. Homburger, supra note 19, at 615.
73. Id.
74. Id. Professor Homburger was of the opinion that Evans indicated that the
Nebraska Supreme Court was among the courts that were "applying the
Field Code rule obediently to toe the traditional line of privity." Id. at 624
n.87. With this contention the authors of this article respectfully disagree,
noting that the court in Evans cited Certia as authority for the general rule
quoted in the text accompanying note 37 supra. Evans required that the
members of the class be able to bring the action jointly, which is a different
concept than the slippery doctrine of "privity."
19821
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utes should control the scope of the Nebraska class action stat-
ute.75 Thus, each prospective plaintiff, including absent members
of a class, must have a common interest in the relief demanded.7 6
The relief demanded must have some common feature; while the
parties need not be affected equally, they must all be affected in
some capacity.7 7 Individuals who have a separate interest and sus-
tain separate damages may not join in the same action.7 8
The scope of the common interest requirement in Nebraska
may be gleaned from the few Nebraska decisions which have con-
strued the permissive joinder provisions. In the early Nebraska
case of Trompen v. Yates,79 the Nebraska Supreme Court recog-
nized that section 40 of the Nebraska Code of Civil Procedure (now
section 25-311-relating to joinder of plaintiffs) encompassed "the
equity practice of taking into the action everybody who claims an
interest in its subject-matter."8 0 The court elaborated upon this
statement in Oss v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity,81 where it al-
lowed an alleged owner of twenty-five head of cattle, a receiver for
a bank that held a mortgage on a portion of the cattle, and a holder
of a chattel mortgage on a portion of the cattle, to join as plaintiffs
under section 25-311 to recover the proceeds of a sale of the cattle
75. See notes 59-62 & accompanying text supra.
76. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-311, -702 (Reissue 1979).
77. McNish, Joinder and Splitting of Causes of Action in Nebraska, 26 NEB. L.
REV. 42, 56 (1946). Professor McNish argued that the class action statute did
not provide for an enlargement of joinder of actions. Id. He also took the
position, however, that this section "merely constitute [sI an exception to the
compulsory joinder of parties statutes." Id. at 56-57. As stated in the text
accompanying notes 42-62 supra, however, the authors disagree with the lat-
ter position.
78. C. KIEGWIN, supra note 34, § 42, at 339.
79. 66 Neb. 525, 92 N.W. 647 (1902).
80. Id. at 530, 92 N.W. at 649. The Trompen court cited Munson v. New York Cent
& H.R.R. Co., 32 Misc. 282,65 N.Y.S. 848 (1900), a New York case which allowed
an insurer who had paid for part of the damage to join with an insured to sue
the tortfeasor. 66 Neb. at 531, 92 N.W. at 649. The court also quoted an Eng-
lish chancery court's declaration: "'All persons having a common right
which is invaded by a common enemy, although they may have different
rights inter se, are entitled to join in respect to that common enemy right."'
Id. (quoting Ellis v. Bedford, 68 Law J. Ch. 289 (1899)). Moreover, the court in
Trompen referred to Missouri, K.&T. Ry, Co. v. Haber, 56 Kan. 694, 44 P. 632
(1896), a Kansas case which held that the joining of 145 parties in one action
for damages against a railroad responsible for spreading splenic fever among
cattle was not error. 66 Neb. at 531, 92 N.W. at 649. In that case, however,
Kansas law gave a lien on cattle to those injured by reason of the communica-
tion of splenic fever, and thus there existed a common right to assert the lien
among the 145 parties. 56 Kan. at 703, 44 P. at 639. No mention was made of a
class action, however, as the 145 individual parties apparently were all named
as parties. Id.
81. 130 Neb. 311, 264 N.W. 897 (1936).
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from the issuer of an indemnity bond.82 The court held that all
plaintiffs had a direct interest in the bond issued to insure pay-
ment because the bond's language was comprehensive enough to
include mortgagees within the bond's protection.83 Thus, the
plaintiffs in Oss had an interest in the relief demanded, although in
unequal proportions. Finally, in Board of Education v. Winne,84
the Nebraska Supreme Court referred to section 25-311 in conjunc-
tion with section 25-30185 as affording a remedy to "interested
parties." 86
Thus, if plaintiffs wish to join together in Nebraska, a joint in-
terest in the sense that they seek relief in solido is not required.
The test appears to require a common interest in the relief de-
manded, even though such interest is in unequal proportions-in
other words, there must be some damage that affects all prospec-
tive plaintiffs. If the action could be maintained separately for sep-
arate relief, joinder is improper because there is no common
interest in the relief demanded:
In general, the various codes provide that all persons having an interest
in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, may be
joined as plaintiffs....
The permissive joinder under the code has a very wide range of appli-
cation. It is immaterial in what proportions the plaintiffs may be severally
concerned. ... Persons, however, who have separate interests and suffer
separate damages may not join.8 7
The Nebraska Supreme Court offered some guidance as to join-
der of causes of action and defendants in Sickler v. City of Broken
Bow.88 In Sickler, the court set forth the following test to deter-
mine whether there is more than one cause of action for purposes
of applying section 25-702:
In determining whether more than one cause of action is stated, the main
test is whether more than one primary right or subject of controversy is
presented, other tests being whether recovery on one ground would bar
recovery on the other, whether the same evidence would support the dif-
ferent counts, and whether separate actions could be maintained for sepa-
rate relief.89
The Sickler court held that causes of action "involving different de-
fendants cannot be joined unless each cause affects them all and
82. Id. at 316, 264 N.W. at 899.
83. Id. at 315-16, 264 N.W. at 899.
84. 177 Neb. 431, 129 N.W.2d 255 (1964).
85. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-301 (Reissue 1979) (action must be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest unless otherwise provided for in NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-304 (Reissue 1979)).
86. 177 Neb. at 436, 129 N.W.2d at 258.
87. 1 BANCROFT's CODE PLEADniNG § 142, at 257-58 (1926).
88. 143 Neb. 542, 10 N.W.2d 462 (1943).
89. Id. at 544-45, 10 N.W.2d at 464.
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they have a joint or common liability or interest; separate causes
against separate defendants cannot be lawfully joined."90 The
court further held, without specifically mentioning section 25-317
(permissive joinder of defendants), that in an injunction action,
"[i]t is only where the act sought to be enjoined is threatened or
being performed by more than one that all may be joined as de-
fendants."91 Therefore, in order for defendants to be properly
joined, they must all participate in the act causing the alleged dam-
age or injury.
As the foregoing Nebraska joinder cases did not involve class
actions, it is necessary to examine the Nebraska cases in which
class actions have been successfully prosecuted and determine
whether the narrow Nebraska joinder rules were satisfied. Doyle v.
Union Insurance Co. 92 represents the only instance in which the
Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed a judgment allowing a class ac-
tion which awarded money damages. While the class action aspect
of Doyle was not challenged, the joinder rules were satisfied.
In Doyle, a policyholder of Old Union, a mutual insurance com-
pany, brought a class action initially seeking to restrain Old Union
and its directors from selling the assets of the company. This equi-
table relief was denied, and the action proceeded as an action for
damages.9 3 The policyholders alleged that the directors of Old
Union breached their fiduciary duties by acting in their own inter-
est, selling Old Union for less than fair value, and failing to make
full disclosure in proxy statements.94 The Nebraska Supreme
Court indicated that the action would have been derivative except
that Old Union had been dissolved, stating: "A shareholders' suit
of this kind is an equitable action, which, except for the fact of dis-
solution of Old Union, would have been for the benefit of the corpo-
ration and not the shareholders." 95
While the court did not address this issue, a class action in a
derivative suit is unnecessary because it adds nothing to the
case.96 Thus, it is probable that but for the dissolution of Old
Union, a class action may not have been proper.
While the court in Doyle did not analyze the propriety of bring-
ing the suit as a class action because it was not a contested issue,
the facts withstand an analysis under the Nebraska joinder rules.
The policyholders suffered a common damage at the hands of the
90. Id. at 545, 10 N.W.2d at 465.
91. Id. at 548, 10 N.W.2d at 465.
92. 202 Neb. 599, 277 N.W.2d 36 (1979).
93. Id. at 601, 277 N.W.2d at 38.
94. Id. at 602, 277 N.W.2d at 38.
95. Id. at 603, 277 N.W.2d at 39.
96. See notes 125-28 & accompanying text infra.
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directors, and thus had the requisite common interest in the sub-
ject matter of the lawsuit. Also, each member of the class was enti-
tled to an amount determinable only by reference to the total
recovery and total shares of other policyholders. Thus, a common
fund was present as each policyholder was entitled to a fractional
interest of the total sum recovered.97
Moreover, Doyle is similar to one of the most common uses of
the class action device in the courts of chancery--"actions by or
against voluntary unincorporated associations to enforce or defend
an action which the association had against an adversary."98 In
such cases, the rights of the group are asserted, not individual
claims for individual relief.
Doyle should be contrasted to the New York case of Society Mil-
ion Athena, Inc. v. National Bank of Greece.99 In that case, two
customers of two banks attempted to bring a class suit against the
banks on the grounds that the banks received and failed to repay
deposits by the two plaintiffs and thousands of other depositors.OO
The New York court refused to allow a class action because there
existed "no joint or common interest in any fund.'01 In the ab-
sence of this common interest, "each person wronged may deter-
mine for himself the remedy which he will seek for the wrong to
him.' 02 The rule followed by the New York court was simply:
"Separate wrongs to separate persons, though committed by simi-
lar means and even pursuant to a single plan, do not alone create a
common or general interest in those who are wronged."' 03
Doyle, on the other hand, involved policyholders who had a
common interest in a wrong perpetrated against Old Union. The
wrong was not directed at the policyholders individually, but col-
lectively. Thus, the interests of the members of the class in Doyle
were unified to the extent they could have brought the action
jointly.
Although the Nebraska joinder rules do not embrace the con-
cept of common questions of law or fact, dicta in Gant v. City of
97. See notes 109-12 & accompanying text infra. Old Union was sold under a con-
tract of reinsurance which included a provision for the purchase of the assets
of Old Union, and a distribution to the policyholders of their equity in the
surplus funds of Old Union. 202 Neb. at 602, 277 N.W.2d at 38. Thus, the poli-
cyholders collectively suffered a damage, even though admittedly in unequal
proportions. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
98. Simeone, supra note 7, at 7.
99. 281 N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d 374 (1939).
100. Id. at 292, 22 N.E.2d at 377.
101. Id. at 294, 22 N.E.2d at 377.
102. Id. at 292, 22 N.E.2d at 377.
103. Id. See Simeone, supra note 7, at 34-35, and authorities cited therein.
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LincolnIL04 has caused considerable confusion because the Ne-
braska Supreme Court implied that a Rule 23(b) (3) type of class
action could be brought in Nebraska. In Gant, a Lincoln policeman
filed a class action to recover amounts which the City of Lincoln
erroneously deducted from the salaries of policemen and firemen
for pension purposes. The court stated:
Parties entitled to share in the fund in question numbered approxi-
mately 400 and the amounts due each were relatively small thus discour-
aging and rendering impractical the bringing of individual suits; the
questions of law and fact presented were common to all and definitely
predominated over individual interests; the claims of the interested indi-
viduals were similar to plaintiff's; in representing his own interests, plain-
tiff necessarily was required to represent the interests of all members of
the class represented; and the class action rendered unnecessary the
proliferation of litigation by individual suits. The accepted requirements
for a class action were present.105
Subsequently, in Blankenship v. Omaha Public Power Dis-
trict,o6 the Nebraska Supreme Court retracted this implication,
holding:
In Gant we did not determine whether or not the suit was properly
brought as a class action. The question there was the power of the trial
court to vacate the judgment after term.... Whatever else was said in
that case about the characteristics of a class suit was dicta. We made no
determination that Gant was a proper class action, we simply said that
having so proceeded did not make the judgment void.107
Thus, the dicta in Gant concerning the requirements for a class
action is not the law in Nebraska.108
104. 193 Neb. 108, 225 N.W.2d 549 (1975).
105. Id. at 109, 225 N.W.2d at 551.
106. 195 Neb. 170, 237 N.W.2d 86 (1976).
107. Id. at 175, 237 N.W.2d at 89.
108. The Gant court cited Keedy v. Reid, 165 Neb. 519, 86 N.W.2d 370 (1957), and
Jacobs v. City of Omaha, 181 Neb. 101, 147 N.W.2d 160 (1966), as authority for
its statement on class actions. In Keedy, 45 individuals signed a petition to
merge two school districts, and the court stated that the signers of the
petition
could have been made parties to the error proceeding in either of two
ways,-by naming each as a party defendant in. error and serving a
summons upon each of them, or by serving summons upon one or
more of the petitioners who are shown by proper allegations in the
petition in error to be members of a class within the purview of sec-
tion 25-319.
165 Neb. at 520-21, 86 N.W.2d at 372. There was no mention of common ques-
tions of law or fact. In Jacobs, the court analyzed the propriety of a class
action as follows: 'There are so many persons involved whose rights are sim-
ilar to those of the plaintiff that it was impracticable to join them all as parties
plaintiff. This action is properly brought as a class action." 181 Neb. at 103,
147 N.W.2d at 162 (emphasis added). The court assumed joinder otherwise
would be proper and made no analysis in terms of common questions of law
or fact. Thus, there is no authority in Keedy and Jacobs supporting the inclu-
sion of a "common question" test in the Gant court's list of requirements. It
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While not at issue in Gant, the question arises whether the suit
involved a proper class action under the Nebraska statute. The an-
swer depends upon whether the action in Gant was to recover
shares of a common fund, or was simply 400 separate claims for
wages wrongfully deducted by an employer.
A common fund is a fund "owned" by more than one person
with each person owning an interest in the entire fund.109 In deter-
mining whether a common fund is present or whether the prayer
for damages is a mere aggregation of separate and distinct claims,
the following test'1 0 is helpful:
(1) If the representative plaintiff were to sue individually and
the amount of his recovery could be determined without reference
to other members of the purported class, then a common fund is
not present, and a class action is improper.
(2) If the representative plaintiff were to sue individually and
the amount of his recovery could only be determined by calculat-
ing his fractional share of the total amount of damages, then a com-
mon fund is present, and assuming that all other requirements are
present, a class action is proper.
In Gant, it is unclear under which of two theories the suit was
brought. It may have been brought against the City of Lincoln as
custodian of the pension fund, with individual recoveries to be
made in proportion to the ownership percentages of the policemen
and firemen in the fund. Alternatively, the suit may have been
brought against the City as the employer who wrongfully deducted
amounts from the salaries of policemen and firemen, with individ-
ual recoveries to be made based on the amounts erroneously de-
ducted on an individual basis. It would appear, however, that a
common fund was present because the court mentioned the
amount erroneously deducted"'1 and approximated the number of
"[p] arties entitled to share in the fund."112 If a common fund were
present in Gant, the requisite common interest among the mem-
bers of the class was present for joinder purposes. If the police-
men and firemen had separate and individual claims, on the other
hand, the Nebraska joinder provisions would not have been
satisfied.
is therefore not surprising that the court in Blankenship retracted the "re-
quirements" set forth in Gant.
109. Fisher v. Superior Oil Co., 390 P.2d 521, 526 (Okla. 1964).
110. See Cass Clay, Inc. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 63 F.R.D. 34, 38 (D.S.D.
1974). Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 202 Neb. 599,277 N.W.2d 36 (1979), for example,
involved a common fund under this test.
111. 193 Neb. at 109, 225 N.W.2d at 551.
112. Id.
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B. Potentiality of Conflict of Interest
A second prerequisite to maintaining a class action in Nebraska
is that the claims of the representative must be typical of the
claims of the class, and the representative must fairly protect the
interests of the class.113 A tool used by the Nebraska Supreme
Court to determine whether a representative fairly represents all
members of the class is the "potentiality of conflict of interest" test
which was applied by the court in Blankenship v. Omaha Public
Power District.14 The court, after adopting the doctrine of virtual
representation, held that this doctrine implicitly requires "that
there must be no conflict of interest between the representative
and those represented."" 5 The Blankenship court found a potenti-
ality for conflict among the members of the class and the repre-
sentatives," 6 and therefore upheld the trial court's dismissal of the
class action aspect of the case upon a motion for summary
judgment.
The court in Blankenship applied the following rule gleaned
from Evans:
As we read [Evans], its rule is that if any party included in the class
stands to suffer an economic loss as the result of his inclusion, the party
initiating the class action will "have an interest adverse to those" of the
party he purports to represent with the result that the action is not being
brought "for the benefit of all members of the class," and the claim as a
class suit must therefore fail.
1 17
The court in Evans dismissed the argument that the action was
brought properly as a class action because there existed a possibil-
ity that some members of the purported class had an interest ad-
verse to the representatives, stating: "Their interest cannot be
said to be sufficiently identical with other ratepayers to permit
plaintiff to maintain this action on behalf of all ratepayers."" 8 In
other words, the potential adverse interest made the class action
improper because the purported class members did not have a
common interest in the relief demanded.
This "potentiality of conflict of interest" test subsequently was
applied by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Kosowski v. City Bet-
terment Corp." 9 Citing both Blankenship and Evans, the court af-
firmed the district court's grant of a motion for summary judgment
dismissing the class action.
113. Blankenship v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 195 Neb. 170, 237 N.W.2d 86 (1976).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 175, 237 N.W.2d at 89-90.
116. Id. at 180, 237 N.W.2d at 90.
117. Id. at 175-76, 237 N.W.2d at 90 (emphasis added).
118. Evans v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 185 Neb. 464, 468, 176 N.W.2d 679, 681
(1970).
119. 197 Neb. 402, 405, 249 N.W.2d 481, 483 (1977).
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A further illustration of the restrictive nature of this test is
found in Twin Loups Reclamation District v. Blessing.12 0 The Ne-
braska Supreme Court again relied upon the potentiality of conflict
of interest analysis to affirm the trial court's denial of representa-
tive status.121 Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of individuals
owning land in an irrigation and/or reclamation district which had
entered into contracts with the government for water reclamation
and supply projects. The court pointed out that "included among
the individuals owning land in the district are those who petitioned
to be included in the districts and must be thought to favor the
undertaking of such a project."1 22 Further, the court noted that the
purported class included "the very directors whose acts are chal-
lenged here."123
Thus, the '"potentiality of conflict of interest" test is a severe
hurdle to overcome even if the joinder requirements are met. This
requirement that representatives and class members do not have
adverse interests has its roots in due process:
It is one thing to say that some members of a class may represent other
members in a litigation where the sole and common interest of the class in
the litigation, is either to assert a common right or to challenge an as-
serted obligation. It is quite another to hold that all those who are free
alternatively either to assert rights or to challenge them are of a single
class, so that any group, merely because it is of the class so constituted,
may be deemed adequately to represent any others of the class in litigat-
ing their interests in either alternative. Such a selection of representa-
tives for purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests are not
necessarily or even probably the same as those whom they are deemed to
represent, does not afford the protection to absent parties which due pro-
cess requires. The doctrine of representation of absent parties in a class
suit has not hitherto been thought to go so far.
12 4
It must be emphasized, however, that the determination of no po-
tential conflicts of interest is not alone sufficient to determine
when a class action is authorized under section 25-319. The ab-
sence of adverse interests is not equivalent to the presence of the
requisite common interest required by the joinder provisions. Fur-
thermore, the following requirements also must be satisfied.
C. Necessity
Even if the joinder requirements are fulfilled and there appears
to be no potential conflicts of interest, a class action may be im-
proper if the same result can be reached by suing individually.
120. 202 Neb. 513, 276 N.W.2d 185 (1979).
121. Id. at 523-24, 276 N.W.2d at 191.
122. Id. at 524, 276 N.W.2d at 191.
123. Id.
124. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940).
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In Berkshire v. Douglas County Board of Equalization,125 the
Nebraska Supreme Court held:
We agree that technically the plaintiffs meet the requirements [of section
25-319]....
In determining whether a class action is properly brought, considera-
ble discretion is vested in the trial court .... Here, we believe the trial
judge could have properly determined that meeting the technical require-
ments of section 25-319 ... is insufficient where no useful purpose is
served by bringing a suit as a class action. The plaintiffs are seeking relief
indirectly. The final result is the same whether the actions are class ac-
tions or individual actions. 12 6
Berkshire involved an appeal by a taxpayer on behalf of all tax-
payers in a school district from a decision of the Douglas County
Board of Equalization that reduced tax revenues of the school dis-
trict.127 Thus, while the taxpayers of the district probably had the
requisite common interest, the relief requested actually was deriv-
ative, and the court correctly ruled that a class action was not
necessary.
Berkshire is significant because many cases have been brought
in Nebraska in which the plaintiffs purported to represent all per-
sons similarly situated, but in which the relief sought involved in-
junctive, derivative, or other equitable relief.128 Examination of
these cases reveals the reason for the Berkshire rule-in each case
the result would have been identical without the class allegations.
Under the rule in Berkshire, the trial court should deny the class in
cases of this genre because the class action adds nothing to the
lawsuit, and the final result would be the same whether a class ac-
tion is brought or an individual action maintained.
D. Manageability
A class action may also be denied if it is unmanageable. In
Kosowski v. City Betterment C07p.,129 the Nebraska Supreme
Court expressed the unmanageability aspect in terms of the diffi-
culty or impossibility of identifying class members:
Also supporting the District Court's granting of the defendant's motion is
the inherent unmanageability of the plaintiffs' proposed class action. A
total of 1,471,834 lottery tickets were sold by the defendant. No records
have been maintained as to the identity of purchasers of lottery tickets.
Certainly a substantial number of those who purchased lottery tickets and
125. 200 Neb. 113, 262 N.W.2d 449 (1978).
126. Id. at 115-16, 262 N.W.2d at 451-52 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 115, 262 N.W.2d at 451.
128. See, e.g., R-R Realty Co. v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 184 Neb. 237, 166
N.W.2d 746 (1969); Hickman v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 173 Neb. 428, 113
N.W.2d 617 (1962); May v. City of Kearney, 145 Neb. 475, 17 N.W.2d 448 (1945);
Taxpayers League v. Wightman, 139 Neb. 212, 296 N.W. 886 (1941).
129. 197 Neb. 402, 249 N.W.2d 481 (1977).
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lost have discarded their losing tickets. Should the plaintiffs ultimately be
successful and an award be recovered, it would be extremely difficult and
impractical, if not impossible, to satisfactorily reach and identify, and dis-
tribute the award to, those entitled to share in it. 13 0
Thus, if all the other requirements for bringing a class action are
satisfied, a trial judge can still refuse class action status if he finds
the action unmanageable.
E. Procedural Requirements For Class Actions
1. Petition
The Nebraska class action statute gives no guidance with re-
spect to the proper procedure to initiate a class action in Nebraska.
The general method is simply to plead that the action is brought on
behalf of all persons similarly situated. However, a better practice
is to define specifically the class in order to eliminate potential
conflicts within a class.131 Also, the petition should contain allega-
tions showing the necessary joint or common interest, numerosity
of parties, impracticability of bringing all members before the
court, and that the representatives of the class fairly represent all
members of the class.
2. Challenge of Class Status
Unlike Rule 23, there is no class certification procedure in Ne-
braska.132 A party wishing to challenge the propriety of a class ac-
tion prior to trial has two options: (1) demurrer, 3 3 or
(2) summary judgment. 34 Obviously, attacking a class action by
demurrer requires the defect to be apparent on the face of the
pleadings.135 Summary judgment allows evidence outside the
pleadings to be offered to establish the impropriety of the class ac-
tion, but there must be no genuine question of triable fact. In de-
termining the propriety of a class action, the trial court has
"considerable discretion." 3 6
130. Id. at 405, 249 N.W.2d at 483.
131. See notes 113-24 & accompanying text supra.
132. Twin Loups Reclamation Dist. v. Blessing, 202 Neb. 513, 523, 276 N.W.2d 185,
191 (1979).
133. Id.
134. Id.; Blankenship v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 195 Neb. 170, 177, 237 N.W.2d 86,
88-89 (1976); Note, Civil Procedure-Class Actions-Summary Judgment-Ne-
braska Supreme Court Authorizes Summary Judgment for Disposition of
Class Action Suit, Blankenship v. O.P.P.D., 195 Neb. 170,237 N.W.2d 86 (1976),
10 CREIGnTON L. REV. 11 (1976).
135. "Speaking demurrers" are not allowed in Nebraska. Christopherson v. Chris-
topherson, 177 Neb. 414, 416, 129 N.W.2d 113, 115 (1964).
136. Berkshire v. Douglas County Bd. of Equalization, 200 Neb. 113,115,262 N.W.2d
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3. Appeal from Denial of Class
An appeal from an order denying a class action will only be al-
lowed if the order is a final order. A 'Tinal order" is defined as
"[a]n order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such
order in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment."137
Such a final order was found by the Nebraska Supreme Court in
Blankenship v. Omaha Public Power District in the trial court's
granting of a motion for summary judgment and dismissal of 'the
action without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to sue on his
own behalf."138 The court allowed an appeal from this order, stat-
ing: "[There] was a final order in this case because the summary
judgment determined the merits of the plaintiffs claim to repre-
sent the class and hence directly affected much of the relief for
which he prayed."139 If the court had not dismissed the lawsuit by
its order in Blankenship, however, it is doubtful whether the order
would have been appealable.
In contrast, "[t] he cases are legion which hold the sustaining of
a demurrer ... is not a final order from which an appeal can be
taken."' 40 It is doubtful whether the denial of a class action by the
sustaining of a demurrer would ever be deemed a final order dis-
missing the action similar to the one entered in Blankenship.141
4. Notice to Class Members
Unlike Federal Rule 23(b) (3), the Nebraska class action statute
does not require notice to absent class members. As the Nebraska
Supreme Court stated in Gant v. City of Lincoln: "[W]e still ad-
here to the general rule which dispenses with such notice in repre-
sentative actions."142 The critical phrase is "in representative
actions." The representative action which developed in the courts
of equity did not include a Rule 23(b) (3) type of class action en-
compassing common questions of law or fact, the type of class ac-
tion in which notice to absent class members is required by Rule
23.
The notice required in Rule 23(b) (3) actions was intended to
449, 452, (1978); Gant v. City of Lincoln, 193 Neb. 108, 110, 225 N.W.2d 549, 551
(1975).
137. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1902 (Reissue 1979).
138. 195 Neb. 170, 171, 237 N.W.2d 86, 87 (1976).
139. Id. at 174, 237 N.W.2d at 89. See also Green v. Terrytown, 188 Neb. 840, 199
N.W.2d 610 (1972) (dismissal of one of several defendants must be appealed
at the time of dismissal).
140. Root v. School Dist. No. 25, 183 Neb. 22, 23, 157 N.W.2d 887, 878 (1968).
141. See text accompanying notes 138-39 supra.
142. 193 Neb. 108, 112, 225 N.W.2d 549, 553 (1975).
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fulfill the requirements of due process.143 Thus, if the Nebraska
statute were expanded judicially' 44 to encompass common ques-
tions of law or fact class actions similar to those allowed under
Rule 23(b) (3), the statute would violate due process. In any event,
the absence of a notice requirement supports the conclusion that
class actions maintainable in Nebraska are limited to true repre-
sentative actions and do not include the Rule 23(b) (3) "common
question" class action.
5. Attorneys' Fees
Attorneys' fees are recoverable if authorized by statute or a uni-
form rule of practice.145 There is no specific statute or rule al-
lowing attorneys' fees in class actions. However, attorneys' fees
may be deducted from amounts recovered if the services of an at-
torney result in the rescuing or preserving of a large amount of
property or funds.146 Thus, if a class action successfully preserves
a common fund, 47 attorneys' fees may be recoverable from the
fund before distribution to class members.
143. Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed Amend-
ments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39
F.R.D. 73, 106-07 (1966). The committee stated:
Indeed, under subdivision (c) (2), notice must be ordered, and is not
merely discretionary, to give the members in a subdivision (b) (3)
class action an opportunity to secure exclusion from the class. This
mandatory notice pursuant to subdivision (c) (2), together with any
discretionary notice which the court may find it advisable to give
under subdivision (d) (2), is designed to fulfill requirements of due
process to which the class procedure is of course subject.
Id.
144. The California Supreme Court, by judicial flat, has expanded the California
class action statute to encompass common questions of law and fact. See
Darr v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695,433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967) and
its progeny. California is one of the four states that have retained a class
action statute patterned after the Field Code. See note 5 supra. The dangers
inherent in this type of judicial legislation are self-evident.
145. Examples of Nebraska statutes which could allow an award of attorney's fees
in a class action are: (1) NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-821 (Reissue 1978) (award of
attorney's fees for actions brought for violations of contracts or combinations
in restraint of trade or monopolization); (2) NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1609 (Reis-
sue 1978) (award of attorney's fees in actions brought for violations of the
Consumer Protection Act); (3) NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1525 (Reissue 1978)
(award of attorney's fees in actions for unfair or deceptive acts in the insur-
ance business); (4) NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1801 (Reissue 1979) (limited award
of attorney's fees in certain types of small claims if 90 days' notice of claim is
given before suit initiated; presumably one notice on behalf of a class would
be sufficient); and (5) NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1118(1) (Reissue 1977) (award of
attorney's fees in actions brought for violations of the Securities Act of
Nebraska).
146. Gamboni v. County of Otoe, 159 Neb. 417, 437, 67 N.W.2d 489, 502 (1954).
147. See notes 109-12 & accompanying text supra.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska class action statute is restricted in scope to cases
where the purported members of the class could be joined under
the Nebraska joinder rules. As common questions of law or fact,
without more, are insufficient for joinder purposes under Nebraska
law, a class action based only on common questions of law or fact
is not authorized under Nebraska law. Moreover, even if the join-
der rules are satisfied, the Nebraska Supreme Court has taken an
extremely restrictive approach. In only one case has the court al-
lowed damages to be recovered by a class,14 8 and in that case the
class action issue was not contested. In other cases, the court im-
posed strict requirements, including the complete absence of con-
flicts of interest among members of the class 149 and the necessity
of the class action to the ultimate relief requested in the litiga-
tion. 5 0 Therefore, as a practical matter, a plaintiff desiring to pur-
sue a class action in Nebraska should fie in federal court
whenever possible because it is virtually impossible to maintain
such an action in state court.
The basic thrust of this article was to analyze the Nebraska
class action procedure and to explain the interrelationship be-
tween class actions and joinder. While Nebraska retains the nar-
row rules of permissive joinder originally enacted in the Field
Code over 130 years ago, which necessarily limits the scope of class
actions, any legislative committees proposing to revise the Ne-
braska procedural code must consider the problems inherent in
procedural rules patterned after Rule 23. William Simon offered
the following criticism:
Whatever your view of the social benefits of converting the Federal judici-
ary into a small claims court, the result of this trend has been to frustrate
the original goals of the intended reform. Instead of improving efficiency,
the [1966] amendment [to Rule 23] has fostered a flood in class litigations
which would not otherwise have been brought. Furthermore, some courts,
reluctant to dismiss even the most unwieldy class action, have resorted to
constitutionally doubtful procedural experiments to make manageable
that which is not manageable. And in their zeal to accommodate class liti-
gation, some courts have cavalierly disregarded or distorted the applicable
substantive law.
It cannot be said that the cost of thus converting the Federal judiciary
into a small claims court has been offset by any substantital social benefit.
The principal-perhaps only-beneficiaries have been lawyers. In com-
bining great incentive for unprofessional conduct by lawyers with little
148. See notes 92-103 & accompanying text supra. In Gant v. City of Lincoln, the
defendant initially consented to the class action, and then after the end of the
term of court, attempted to attack the consent judgment by raising the class
action issue. 193 Neb. 108, 109, 225 N.W.2d 549, 551 (1975).
149. See notes 113-24 & accompanying text supra.
150. See notes 125-28 & accompanying text supra.
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potential to benefit their clients, the amended Rule [23], as interpreted by
some District Courts, poses serious threats to public confidence in the ju-
diciary and the integrity of the bar.1 5 1
When New York was considering "reforming" its class action
statute, Professor Homburger criticized the restrictive nature of
the Field Code and quoted Mr. Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes on
the contemporary usefulness of ancient legal institutions in
general:
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his
strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next is either to kill
him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal.1 52
This article attempted to bring the Nebraska class action out of its
cave. It is hoped that thoughtful consideration will be given to any
"reform" of the Nebraska procedural code, and that the reformers
understand that the representative action authorized by the Ne-
braska class action statute is a much different animal than the
Rule 23(b) (3) class action. Moreover, even if a Rule 23 type statute
is not adopted by Nebraska, liberalization of the Nebraska joinder
rules, without express limitations in the class action area, could
cause a procedural nightmare because the Nebraska class action
statute has none of the due process safeguards incorporated into
Rule 23 that were intended to protect the rights of absent class
members in Rule 23(b) (3) actions. Thus, piecemeal incorporation
of Federal Rule principles into the Nebraska procedural code could
cause unintended complications.
151. Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.D. 375, 377
(1972).
152. Homburger, supra note 19, at 609 (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)).
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